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1 
EXCESSIVE FORCE, POLICE DOGS, AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: 
THE USE OF SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN  
LOWRY v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
Abstract: On June 6, 2017, in Lowry v. City of San Diego, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc upheld a district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment, dismissing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for use of excessive 
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in the context 
of “bite and hold” training for police dogs. This Comment argues that although the 
use of force in Lowry may have been reasonable, the court was incorrect in decid-
ing this question as a matter of law. The fact-intensive objective reasonableness test 
should only be resolved through summary judgment on those rare occasions where 
the facts of the situation are not in dispute and the answer is clear as a matter of 
law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of police dogs is not generally what comes to mind when talking 
about the use of excessive force by police, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit has addressed this issue in a series of cases arising from po-
lice practices in Southern California.1 Police dogs are primarily used to detect 
suspects, and the resultant force can sometimes be deployed out of the sight of 
their handler, with the dog determining the amount of force applied.2 Police 
officers have a range of types of force at their disposal that can be categorized 
either as deadly or nondeadly.3 The use of deadly force, such as guns, is ana-
lyzed under a stringent balancing test that requires a serious threat of bodily 
harm to be present.4 Courts have determined that the use of police dogs does 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Mark Weintraub, A Pack of Wild Dogs? Chew v. Gates and Police Canine Excessive Force, 34 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 937, 937 (2001). See generally Lowry v. City of San Diego (Lowry), 858 F.3d 
1248, 1260 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 5, 2017) (No. 17-706); Lowry 
v. City of San Diego (Lowry II), 818 F.3d 840, 856 (9th Cir. 2016) (involving the use of a police dog 
to investigate a suspected burglary). 
 2 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 937–38. The scenario that generally occurs is the police are called in 
to locate a suspect or investigate an unknown scene for potential suspects. Id. at 938. The officers will 
warn a suspect of the presence of the dog and if the person does not comply, the canine can and often 
will be deployed to find and hold the suspect until the officer arrives to order the animal down. Id. 
 3 See id. at 939.  
 4 See id. at 943–44 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11(1985) (explaining that deadly 
force is only appropriate when an officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect presents a threat 
of significant physical harm, such as possessing a weapon)). Consequently, there is a greater possibil-
ity that the use of deadly force is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 944. 
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not generally constitute deadly force, therefore these cases are evaluated under 
a more lenient reasonableness standard as part of a Fourth Amendment in-
quiry.5 
In June 2017, in Lowry v. City of San Diego, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc upheld a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, dismissing a claim for use of excessive force in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 in the context of “bite and hold” training for police dogs.6 One 
member of the en banc panel dissented, arguing that a reasonable jury could 
find that the force was severe and the government’s interest in the use of that 
force did not outweigh the intrusion; consequently, the use of force was “un-
reasonable.”7 
This Comment argues that the majority in Lowry incorrectly labeled the 
amount of force in this case as “moderate” and resolved this case on summary 
judgment when it should have been left for a jury to evaluate.8 Part I of this 
Comment discusses the development of the “objective reasonableness” test 
under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1989 decision Graham v. Connor as a means 
of evaluating claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for use of excessive force in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.9 Part II explains the 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the use of a police 
dog is generally considered nondeadly force). Currently, deadly force is appropriate “where the officer 
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the 
officer or to others.” Weintraub, supra note 1, at 944 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 9–12 (holding a 
Tennessee statute authorizing the use of deadly force to prevent escape of all felony suspects to be 
unconstitutional because it is not justified to use deadly force against someone who poses no immedi-
ate threat of physical harm to an officer or others)). This Comment is limited to a discussion of non-
deadly force. 
 6 858 F.3d at 1260. Selected panel rulings by a Federal Court of Appeals can be reviewed by the 
court’s full membership, a process called “en banc” review that is rarely invoked. Tracey E. George, 
The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 
214 (1999). The en banc court’s ruling subsequently becomes the circuit’s decision, vacating any 
earlier panel decision. Id. The decision contemplated the use of “bite and hold” training, which condi-
tions a police dog to find and bite the suspect, maintaining contact until an officer is able to subdue 
the person. Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1254 (stating that the San Diego Police Department trained their dogs 
to find and control suspects by locating them, biting, and holding until a handler commanded the dog 
to release); see also Karen Grigsby Bates, In Los Angeles County, It’s ‘Bark and Hold’ vs. ‘Find and 
Bite,’ NPR (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/10/08/230550397/in-los-
angeles-county-its-bark-and-hold-vs-find-and-bite [https://perma.cc/6X9V-KT7P] (discussing the 
challenges of using police dogs that are trained to bite and hold ). An alternative method of training 
not discussed in this case is “circle and bark,” which involves a dog locating a suspect and, as long as 
the suspect remains motionless, circling and barking until the handler takes control. Jonathan K. Dor-
riety, Police Service Dogs in the Use-of-Force Continuum, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 88, 94–95 
(2005) (detailing the two primary apprehension techniques taught to police dogs, “bite and hold” and 
“circle and bark,” and noting that even dogs trained to “circle and bark” will bite if suspect attempts to 
flee). 
 7 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1261 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). 
 8 See infra notes 12–132 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 12–53 and accompanying text. 
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majority’s opinion after the en banc rehearing of Lowry, the relevant case law 
on police dogs, and how the precedent cases were used to support different 
conclusions between the first appeal and rehearing.10 Lastly, Part III argues 
that the Ninth Circuit erred in maintaining the district court’s evidentiary rul-
ings and should not have upheld grant of summary judgment because the fact-
intensive Graham analysis is best left to a jury and it precluded an examination 
of municipal liability.11 
I. EXCESSIVE FORCE AND “OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS” 
 Section A of this Part will develop and discuss the history of excessive 
force claims against police officers in the context of police dogs and will lay 
out the governing constitutional provisions and subsequent judicial standards 
applied.12  Section B of this Part will review the Fourth Amendment objective 
reasonableness test that was developed in Graham and subsequently used as 
the foundation for analysis throughout Lowry.13 Lastly, Section C of this Part 
will provide the factual and procedural history of Lowry.14 
A. History of Constitutional Protections Against Use of  
Excessive Force by Police Officers 
Claims of use of excessive force by police officers are most often brought 
in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes private parties to 
enforce their federal constitutional rights against defendants.15 Over time, the 
courts have distinguished between the different constitutional protections and 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 54–112 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 113–132 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–24 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 36–53 and accompanying text. 
 15 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Excessive Force § 6, Westlaw (da-
tabase updated Dec. 2017). The statute holds state actors responsible for the harms they cause when, 
in their official capacity, they infringe upon the rights of a United States citizen. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Most commonly, defendants are government employees, who act under the color of state law because 
their jobs require them to exercise authority on behalf of the state. Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. 
Levinson, 1 STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1.3, Westlaw (database updat-
ed Nov.2017). In order establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and prove that (1) the 
plaintiff was deprived of a federally protected right (2) by the defendant acting under color of state 
law, and (3) that as a proximate result of that deprivation (4) the plaintiff was injured. 21 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 3d Excessive Force § 6. The focus of these sorts of civil rights claims is often on the 
individual officer responsible for deploying the force, but sometimes plaintiffs go straight to the city 
itself, hoping to impose municipal liability. Amit Singh, Accountability Matters: An Examination of 
Municipal Liability in Sec. § 1983 Actions, 47 U. OF PAC. L. REV. 105, 109 (2015). Individual defend-
ants may assert a qualified immunity defense, which excuses the officer from liability if his or her 
actions do not infringe established constitutional rights; however, a municipal defendant may not use 
this defense. Glen N. Lenhoff, View of the Present and Future of 42 U.S.C. 1983, MICH. B.J., May 
2015, at 29. 
4 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
corresponding standards that are used to evaluate excessive force claims in 
different contexts.16 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Graham, early analy-
sis of excessive force claims derived from several different constitutional pro-
visions.17 Courts either applied substantive due process or assumed that there 
was a basic “right to be free from excessive force” within in the principles of 
§ 1983 rather than enumerated constitutional rights.18 Since Graham, instead 
of using a one-test-fits-all approach when dealing with § 1983 excessive force 
actions, courts apply different constitutional provisions depending on the cir-
cumstances.19 First, the court identifies the particular constitutional right that 
has allegedly been violated by the use of force; the court then evaluates that 
claim in the context of the specific constitutional standard that governs that 
right.20 
The two main sources of constitutional protection against violent actions by 
public officers are the Fourth and Eighth Amendments of the Constitution of the 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (evaluating excessive force under the 
Fourth Amendment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (evaluating excessive force under 
the Eighth Amendment); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1031 (1973) (evaluating excessive force 
under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 17 See Nicholas T. Davis & Philip B. Davis, Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force: A Greater 
or Lesser Role for Juries?, 47 N.M. L. REV. 291, 296 (2017); see also Jonathan R. Nash, The Supreme 
Court and the Regulation of Risk in Criminal Law Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 171, 178–79 (2012) 
(recalling that prior to Graham, lower federal courts applied a single multi-factor test in all § 1983 
actions alleging excessive force by government agents, regardless of whether the context of the force 
invoked a particular constitutional standard). 
 18 Graham, 490 U.S. at 393 (citing Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033 (applying substantive due process 
standard to a case involving a pre-trial detainee by evaluating the need for force compared to the total 
force used, the extent of the harm caused, and whether the force was applied in a good faith attempt to 
preserve or return to order or if it was applied to “maliciously or sadistically” cause harm)). The dis-
trict court decision in Graham evaluated the case involving a free citizen using the Glick due process 
standard. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248–49 (W.D.N.C. 1986). The dissenting 
judge on appeal argued that the court’s decisions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) required investigatory stops that give rise to excessive force claims be 
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness standard.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 
392. The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent and determined that because the plaintiff in Graham 
was neither a pre-trial detainee nor a prisoner, but was in fact a free citizen, the substantive due pro-
cess standard was inappropriate and the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard should be used 
instead. Id. at 394; see also John Wetherell, Civil Rights—Claims That Law Enforcement Officials 
Exercised Excessive Force in the Course of an Arrest, Investigatory Stop, or Other Seizure of a Free 
Citizen Are Properly Analyzed Under the Fourth Amendment’s Reasonableness Standard, 40 DRAKE 
L. REV. 639, 643 (1991). 
 19 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393–94 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 7–22 (stating that the validity of 
the claim must be analyzed using a specific constitutional standard that governs that particular right to 
be free from physical force, rather than a broader excessive force standard)) (addressing a claim that 
use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect who did not appear dangerous violated the sus-
pect’s constitutional rights). The Court in Graham rejected the idea that all excessive force claims 
brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard. Id. at 393. 
 20 Id. at 394. 
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United States.21 Graham established that the Fourth Amendment governs all ex-
cessive use of force cases in investigatory stops and arrest situations involving 
“free citizens.”22 Alternatively, when a plaintiff brings an excessive force claim 
after a criminal conviction and in the context of punishment, the claim is judged 
under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.23 Whereas the Fourth Amendment requires an objective reasonableness 
standard, the Eighth Amendment standard of “cruel” and “unusual” suggests the 
need for an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of the officer.24 
B. The Fourth Amendment Objective Reasonableness Test 
The Fourth Amendment reasonableness test is an objective standard that 
balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights with the governmental interests in using force that gave 
grounds to the intrusion.25 An officer is often required to make quick decisions 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Id. A third, more complicated category exists for pre-trial detainees who are neither free citi-
zens nor convicted criminals, in which case the applicable test is the Fourteenth Amendment substan-
tive due process analysis. See id. at 395 n.10 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–39 (1979)); 
Douglas B. McKechnie, Don’t Daze, Phase, or Lase Me, Bro! Fourth Amendment Excessive-Force 
Claims, Future Nonlethal Weapons, and Why Requiring an Injury Cannot Withstand a Constitutional 
or Practical Challenge, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 142 (2011) (discussing the circuit split on pre-trial 
detainees and excessive force claims). The Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process test is a 
subjective test that generally involves evaluating the need for force compared to the total force used, 
the extent of the harm caused, and whether the force was applied in a good faith attempt to preserve or 
return to order or if it was applied with the malevolent purpose of causing harm. Wetherell, supra note 
18, at 641–42 (citing Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033). 
 22 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Graham involved a diabetic man who brought a § 1983 claim for 
injuries sustained when law enforcement officers used physical force against him during an investiga-
tory stop. Id. at 389–90. Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual within the United States has a right 
to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure by a government official. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV. The Fourth Amendment reads in relevant part: “The right of people to be secure in their persons 
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Id. 
 23 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327 (analyzing excessive force to subdue a convicted prisoner under 
an Eighth Amendment standard); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (quoted 
in Graham, 490 U.S. at 398 (“[T]he less protective Eighth Amendment standard applies ‘only after 
the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prose-
cutions.’”)). 
 24 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 398 (reasoning that the terms “cruel” and “punishment” under the 
Eighth Amendment require analysis of the officer’s subjective state of mind whereas the term “unrea-
sonable” in the Fourth Amendment is objective and has no place for subjective elements such as “mal-
ice” and “sadism”). To establish an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner 
must demonstrate that the force was “sadistically and maliciously applied for the very purpose of 
causing harm.” Id. at 398 n.11; McKechnie, supra note 21, at 141–42. In Graham, the Glick test was 
inappropriate for the Fourth Amendment claim because the test required a consideration of whether 
the officers were acting in good faith or malevolently for the purpose of causing harm, factors that 
look at the subjective motivations of individual officers and have no bearing on an objective evalua-
tion. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citing Glick, 481 F.2d at 1034). 
 25 Mitchell W. Karsch, Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When Does Seizure End?, 
58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 825 (1990) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 394). The “reasonableness” of any 
6 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
during high-pressure, potentially dangerous situations, therefore the “reasona-
bleness” of the action should be judged from the “perspective of a reasonable 
officer on the scene,” rather than an officer with the “20/20 vision of hind-
sight.”26 The proper inquiry in the Fourth Amendment context asks whether 
the police officer’s decision to use force was objectively reasonable given the 
situation, without giving consideration to the officer’s state of mind.27 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham and subsequent 
cases applying the framework, the analysis of Fourth Amendment excessive 
force claims has evolved into a three-step process.28 The analysis begins with 
an assessment of the severity of the alleged violation of the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights by considering the “type and amount of force inflicted.”29 
This is followed by an evaluation of the government’s interest in using the 
force and concluded by weighing the nature and quality of the intrusion against 
the government’s interest in the use of force.30 
The Court in Graham laid out three factors that should be considered 
when evaluating the government’s interest in a particular use of force: “the 
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to 
the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”31 It is important to note, howev-
er, that these factors are not exclusive; rather, the court should examine the 
                                                                                                                           
given seizure rests not only upon its timing and circumstances, but also on the manner in which it is 
effectuated. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 5). The Graham Court explicitly 
stated the implicit reasoning from Garner, that the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard 
governs all excessive force claims in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop. Id. 
 26 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (explaining that 
Fourth Amendment precedent has recognized that an officer’s right to stop a person for arrest or in-
vestigation is necessarily accompanied by a right to use some amount of coercion to carry it out)); see 
also Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033 (finding that not all physical contact, even if in hindsight it seems unduly 
rough, necessarily violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 27 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
 28 See id. at 396 (laying out the reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment as a fact-
intensive inquiry); see, e.g., Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397) (evaluating an excessive force claim involving a beanbag shotgun using the 
Graham Fourth Amendment analysis).  
 29 See Glenn, 673 F.3d at 871 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (beginning analysis by consider-
ing the amount of force used when officers shot suspect with the beanbag gun). 
 30 See id. 871–72 (evaluating the strength of the government’s interest in using force by examin-
ing the totality of the circumstances based on the Graham factors). 
 31 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (instructing courts to pay careful attention to the facts and cir-
cumstances of each particular case); see also Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9 (evaluating whether the totality 
of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of seizure). The Ninth Circuit has often said that the 
most important factor in the analysis is whether the individual posed an “immediate threat to the safe-
ty of the officers or others.” See, e.g., Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872–75 (analyzing the Graham factors to 
evaluate the government’s interest in using force); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826, 831 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Graham factors are not exclusive and considering other factors such as 
whether officers issued a warning prior to using force, and whether there were less intrusive means 
available). 
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totality of the circumstances and consider the specific factors in any given case 
that may be appropriate beyond the Graham factors.32 
The Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” test is not only an objective 
test, but is also a fact intensive inquiry into the circumstances of the particular 
case.33 In the excessive force context, juries often have to sort through factual 
disputes and make inferences, leading the Ninth Circuit to caution that sum-
mary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should 
not be granted frequently.34 The analysis done on the merits of the question of 
whether the use of force was objectively reasonable based on the Graham fac-
tors should be taken into consideration by the jury.35 
C. Factual and Procedural History of Lowry v. City of San Diego 
Lowry v. City of San Diego is a case involving a § 1983 claim, alleging 
that a police officer’s use of force during an investigatory sweep constituted a 
violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.36 On February 11, 2010 
at around 10:40 p.m., three San Diego Police Department officers, including 
Sergeant Bill Nulton and his police service dog Bak, responded within minutes 
to a burglar alarm that was triggered in a two-story San Diego office build-
ing.37 As the officers approached the building, they saw an open suite door on 
the second-story balcony.38 Outside the door to the dark suite and unable to see 
inside, Sergeant Nulton yelled loudly, “This is the San Diego Police Depart-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872 (citing Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826). Other relevant factors that can be con-
sidered include the potential for less invasive alternatives to the force used and whether the government 
agents cautioned the citizen of the potential use of force. See id. 
 33 See id. at 871 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397) (asking whether the officers’ use of force was 
objectively reasonable given the facts and circumstances of the situation facing them). 
 34 See id. (citing Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)) and Espi-
nosa v. City & County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (2010) (“[T]his court has often held that 
in police misconduct cases, summary judgment should only be granted ‘sparingly’ because such cases 
often turn on credibility determinations by a jury.”). 
 35 Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical Application of 1983 as 
It Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO L. REV. 571, 577–78 (2005) [here-
inafter Blum, Qualified Immunity]. It should be noted that the excessive force Fourth Amendment 
inquiry is different from the qualified immunity inquiry, which often also occurs in context such as 
these because the claims involve government officers. See id. Qualified immunity asks whether a 
reasonable officer would have understood that the law, as established at the time and applied to the 
officer’s conduct, was clear enough to give him notice or fair warning that the officer’s conduct was 
considered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 
(2001)). 
 36 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1248. 
 37 Id. at 1253. 
 38 Id. The plaintiff argued that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the door leading 
to the suite was actually open, however the court ultimately decided that she did not present admissi-
ble evidence to dispute the officer’s testimony that the door was open. Id. at 1255. 
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ment! Come out now or I’m sending in a police dog! You may be bitten!”39 
When no one responded, the officers reasoned that a burglary might be under-
way and that the perpetrator was still inside.40 After the officer repeated the 
warning, again to no response, Nulton unleashed Bak into the suite to search 
the offices and immediately followed, searching with his flashlight.41 When 
Nulton and Bak entered the final office in the suite, Nulton detected a person 
covered by a blanket on the couch.42 At the same time, Bak jumped onto the 
couch and bit the person on the lip before Nulton promptly gave Bak the 
command to stand down.43 
The person asleep under the blanket was an employee of the office suite 
where the incident occurred named Sara Lowry.44 After visiting a few bars that 
evening and drinking with friends, Lowry had returned to the office around 
9:30 p.m. and fell asleep on the couch.45 When she woke up to use the bath-
room some time later, she instinctively went to the bathroom she normally 
used during the workday, accidentally setting off the burglar alarm.46 After-
ward, she returned to her own office and fell back asleep on the couch until the 
encounter with Nulton and Bak.47 Lowry was taken to the hospital where she 
received three stiches to her upper lip.48 
Lowry subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a single 
cause of action against the City of San Diego, alleging that the city’s policy 
and practice of training police service dogs to “bite and hold” individuals re-
sulted in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.49 The district court 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. at 1253. Sergeant Nulton waited between thirty and sixty seconds and repeated the warn-
ings. Id. Lowry contended that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the warnings were 
given and whether the suite was actually dark, however the court decided that the district court had not 
abused its discretion in finding that Lowry had provided no admissible evidence to establish the dis-
pute of fact. Id. at 1255. 
 40 Id. at 1253. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 1253–54. 
 43 Id. at 1254. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. Lowry had five vodka drinks that evening before returning to the office suite. Id. 
 46 Id. She typically used a bathroom in a neighboring suite occupied by a separate company and 
in the process of entering that suite, she triggered the burglar alarm. Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. Lowry did not sue the individual police officers, but rather sought to establish the city’s 
liability under the case Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id. at 1255. A 
plaintiff hoping to prove municipal liability under § 1983 must show that the municipality’s custom or 
policy demonstrated a “deliberate indifference” to his or her constitutional rights, a standard that puts 
a large burden on any plaintiff and often results in plaintiffs left without relief because they are unable 
to meet it. Karen M. Blum, Making Out the Monell Claim under Section 1983, 25 TOURO L. REV. 
829, 829–30 (detailing methods of showing municipal liability); Singh, supra note 15, at 109 (quoting 
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989) (expanding on the Monell decision by providing 
the “deliberate indifference” standard for determining municipal liability)). The theory of respondeat 
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granted the city’s motion for summary judgment.50 Lowry appealed, and a di-
vided three-judge Ninth Circuit panel reversed the summary judgment and re-
manded for further proceedings.51 The Ninth Circuit granted the City of San 
Diego’s petition for rehearing en banc and ultimately affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment.52 Lowry subsequently filed a Petition for 
Certiorari on September 5, 2017 and the United States Supreme Court has 
docketed that petition.53 
II. BALANCING THE SEVERITY OF THE INTRUSION WITH GOVERNMENT 
INTERESTS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S PRECEDENT ON POLICE DOGS 
Lowry v. City of San Diego was not the first time that the Ninth Circuit 
had been confronted with the issue of excessive force in the context of police 
dogs.54 The Ninth Circuit has consistently upheld the reasonableness of the use 
of police dogs, labeling their use generally as severe, but nondeadly force.55 
Lowry added to this body of Ninth Circuit law when it determined that the 
force in this case was moderate and reasonable in light of the circumstances.56 
Section A of this Part will discuss the Ninth Circuit’s precedent regarding po-
lice dog excessive force cases.57 Section B of this Part will delve into the rea-
soning of the en banc decision in Lowry in light of these prior Ninth Circuit 
cases.58 
                                                                                                                           
superior does not apply to municipalities, so in order to prevail, the plaintiff must identify a policy or 
custom as the cause of injury rather than the action of the officer specifically. Singh, supra note 15, at 
114 (citing Bd. Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 401 (1997)). To prevail on that claim, Lowry 
needed to have established that (1) SDPD’s use of Bak amounted to an unconstitutional application of 
excessive force, and (2) the city’s policy caused the constitutional wrong. Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1255. It 
is undisputed that SDPD trains dogs to “locate and control persons on command” by finding a person, 
biting them, and holding that bite until a police officer handler commands the dog to release the bite. 
Id. at 1254. Police dogs may be left on the bite until an officer has handcuffed the suspect, taking him 
or her into custody. Id. 
 50 Lowry v. City of San Diego (Lowry I), No. 11-CV-946-MMA, 2013 WL 2396062 *1, *8 (S.D. 
Cal. 2013). 
 51 Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 856. 
 52 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1248, 1260. 
 53 Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-706 (U.S. 
Sept. 5, 2017). 
 54 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 707 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judg-
ment where a reasonable jury could have concluded that force was excessive); Miller v. Clark County, 
340 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment where under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the government’s interest in using force outweighed the plaintiff’s interest in not having 
force exerted on him); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing summary judg-
ment). 
 55 See e.g., Smith, 394 F.3d at 689; Miller, 340 F.3d at 959; Chew, 27 F.3d at 1432. 
 56 See Lowry v. City of San Diego (Lowry), 858 F.3d 1248, 1260 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) peti-
tion for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 5, 2017) (No. 17-706). 
 57 See infra notes 59–76 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 77–112 and accompanying text. 
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A. Police Dogs in the Ninth Circuit 
In the Ninth Circuit, there are two precedent cases reversing the district 
courts’ uses of summary judgment in excessive force dog bite incidents.59 In 
1994, the Ninth Circuit in Chew v. Gates found that the district court had erred 
in granting summary judgment to the defendant because there was a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the release of the dog was unreasonable.60 
Given that the dog in Chew bit the plaintiff three times and dragged him from 
his hiding place, the court determined that the type and amount of force used 
was severe.61 The court analyzed the Graham v. Connor  factors, which in-
clude the severity of the crime, whether or not the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively 
resisting or evading the officers.62 Because the Graham factors did not all 
clearly support one side or the other, the court reversed summary judgment on 
the question of Fourth Amendment reasonableness and concluded that this was 
a question for the jury.63 The court also addressed municipal liability under 
Monell v. Department of Social Services, questioning whether the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for the city could be upheld on the grounds 
that the plaintiff’s injury did not result from the use of force under an official 
city policy or custom.64 Summary judgment was reversed on this issue because 
given the facts, a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff’s injuries came as 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Smith, 394 F.3d 689; Chew, 27 F.3d 1432. 
 60 Chew, 27 F.3d at 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 61 Id. at 1441. 
 62 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (establishing these factors); Chew, 27 F.3d at 
1441–43 (applying the factors set out in Graham). 
 63 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (laying out the factors to be considered when evaluating the gov-
ernment’s interest in the use of force, including the severity of the crime involved, whether the suspect 
presents an immediate danger to the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting or evading 
arrest); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443. The absence of an immediate threat to the officers or others, the most 
important factor in the analysis, weighed in favor of the plaintiff. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441–42. Officers 
initially stopped the plaintiff for a traffic violation when he fled the scene and hid in a scrapyard. Id. at 
1442. They subsequently discovered that there were outstanding arrest warrants for the suspect and a 
police perimeter was set and K9 units were called in to locate the plaintiff. Id. According to Chew, 
when he saw the police dog, he had yelled to surrender, however both sides agree that at that point, the 
K9 officer was not in sight and that the officer did not immediately accede to the plaintiff’s request, 
allowing the dog to bite him. Id. The other two factors cut only slightly in favor of the defendants. Id. 
Although he may not have been physically resisting arrest, he did flee the scene, and although the 
initial crime being responded to was a traffic violation, the existence of three felony arrest warrants 
for the plaintiff put the officers on guard, although the danger may have been diminished by the pres-
ence of a police perimeter. Id. at 1442–43. 
 64 Chew, 27 F.3d. at 1444–45 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (ana-
lyzing whether the plaintiff’s injury came as a result of city policy). Under Monell, a city’s policy or 
custom causes a constitutional injury where it is the “moving force” behind the harm. See Monell, 436 
U.S. at 694. 
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a result of the execution of city policy.65 The case was remanded for trial and 
police departments were warned that the “bite and hold” policy may be uncon-
stitutional.66  
Similarly, in 2005, the Ninth Circuit in Smith v. City of Hemet reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable 
jury could have concluded that the defendant’s use of a police dog was exces-
sive force.67 Analyzing the Graham factors, the court determined the cumula-
tive force used against him was severe and once again not all of the factors 
weighed in favor of the government.68 Therefore there was enough evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the force was exces-
sive.69 
In contrast, in 2003, the Ninth Circuit in Miller v. Clark County deter-
mined that there was no use of excessive force, despite the seriousness of the 
plaintiff’s injuries, and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ant.70 Similar to Chew, the court determined that the type and amount of force 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1444 (noting that the officer had acted under instructions based on city 
policy, which authorized officers to use police dogs trained to bite and hold to seize all hidden sus-
pects, regardless of the level of danger the person posed to the officers and therefore, a reasonable jury 
could find that the city’s policy was the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s injuries). The court also 
explained that municipal liability does not need to be based on an unreasonable action by an officer, 
noting that a jury could find that despite the reasonableness of an officer’s decision on the scene, the 
city was still at fault for providing officers with dogs trained to bite any concealed suspect. See id. at 
1445 (suggesting that in order to prove this, plaintiff would have to show that a less dangerous train-
ing method for dogs was feasible and effective). 
 66 See id. at 1435 (remanding the case to trial by jury, reversing the summary judgment on both 
the reasonableness analysis and the municipal liability issue); David G. Savage, When Bites Are 
Worse Than Barks, ABA J., Sept. 1996, at 38, 39. 
 67 Smith, 394 F.3d at 694, 701–03 (addressing a case in which the suspect refused to obey police 
orders, attempted to re-enter residence and was subsequently attacked by police dog in right shoulder 
and neck area, on his left side, and on his buttock). In addition to the use of a police dog, the force 
used also included four blasts of pepper spray, slamming the defendant face down onto the ground, 
and dragging him off the porch. Id. at 703–04. It is, however, important to note that lesser force can 
still be considered unreasonable in certain circumstances. See id. at 704 (citing Santos v. Gates, 287 
F.3d 846, 853–54 (holding that shoving can be excessive when it is unreasonable)). 
 68 See id. at 701–03 (referring to the totality of the force used, including but not limited to the 
police dog). 
 69 Id. at 703. There was no evidence of any immediate threat to officers or others and the situation in 
question involved a domestic dispute, which provided little basis for the officers’ use of physical force. 
Id. at 702–03. The defendant did not show any signs of fleeing the area or violent resistance, although he 
did refuse to follow the orders of the officers. Id. at 703 
 70 See Miller, 340 F.3d at 963, 968 (affirming summary judgement for the defendant, deciding 
that given the totality of the circumstances, the government’s interest in using a police dog to seize the 
plaintiff outweighed the plaintiff’s interest in not being bitten and was not a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights). The court in Miller also re-emphasized that the ability of a well-trained police 
dog to fatally injure a suspect under abnormal circumstances does not transform otherwise nondeadly 
force into deadly force. See id. at 963 (citing Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido, 139 F.3d 623, 663 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that in order for force to be categorized as deadly, the force must pose “more than 
a remote possibility” of death under the circumstances that it is being used)). 
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used in this case was “serious,” given how deep and significant the wounds 
were to his arm.71 In assessing the government’s interest in using force in this 
case however, the court found that all three of the Graham factors weighed in 
favor of the government.72 First, the severity of the crime weighed in favor of 
the government because the plaintiff was wanted for both a traffic violation 
and a prior felony, which gives the government a legitimate interest in appre-
hending the individual.73 Second, the plaintiff in this case presented an imme-
diate threat to the officers’ safety because he had refused to follow police or-
ders, officers knew he had been in possession of a large knife, and if the en-
counter turned violent, the plaintiff would have possessed an advantage over 
the officers.74 And finally, the plaintiff was actively evading arrest by flight 
while he was hiding in the woods.75 When balancing the government’s inter-
ests with the use of force, the court determined that the force was reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances.76 
B. The En Banc Decision in Lowry 
In Lowry, on rehearing en banc in 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the district court had not erroneously determined that there was 
no genuine issue of material fact and that when evaluated, the Graham factors 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See id. at 964 (citing Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)) (ac-
knowledging that the prolonged duration of a bite could constitute excessive force and concluding the 
force in this case was “serious”); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441 (reasoning that because the dog bit and held 
the plaintiff for a long period of time, which could cause a suspect pain and bodily injury, the force 
constituted a serious intrusion on the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights)). Due to the dark and un-
familiar woods in which the plaintiff was found, it took the officer in Miller almost a minute to locate 
the dog and suspect, at which point the dog was ordered to release the suspect when the officer ascer-
tained that the suspect was not armed. Miller, 340 F.3d at 961. 
 72 Miller, 340 F.3d at 964–65 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
 73 See id. at 964 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (noting the govern-
ment’s vested interest in investigating crimes and holding perpetrators accountable)). 
 74 See id. at 965 (explaining that officers believed the plaintiff would attempt to stage an ambush 
and the dark woods and his unknown location would have given Miller an advantage over the officers, 
putting them in danger). Additionally, deputies told the officers responding that the house where the 
plaintiff lived was “not law-enforcement friendly” and that a mentally ill person lived there. Id. at 960. 
The K9 deputy was told the plaintiff had been seen running away from the house minutes before and 
he observed a knife in the back of the plaintiff’s car, which he claims made it more likely that the 
plaintiff was armed. Id. The officer’s search party tracked the plaintiff through the woods and eventu-
ally the officer let the dog loose, commanding him to search, at which point the officers located the 
plaintiff when they heard him scream after being bitten by the dog. Id. 
 75 See id. at 965–66 (citing Chew, 27 F.3d at 1442 (finding the third Graham factor in favor of 
defendants where plaintiff fled and hid from police prior to arrest)). 
 76 See id. at 968 (reasoning that under the circumstances confronting the police, the use of a dog 
was proper to aid the officers in safely arresting the suspect). Because the plaintiff’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights were not violated, the court did not reach the question of municipal liability. See id. at 968 
n.14 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 658). 
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cumulatively weighed in favor of the city.77 Conversely, both the Ninth Circuit 
panel on the first appeal and the dissent to the final en banc opinion asserted 
that the city failed to demonstrate that there were no questions of fact.78 There-
fore, the district court had erred in concluding that no reasonable jury could 
find that the force in question was excessive and unconstitutional.79 
The plaintiff’s arguments on appeal were threefold.80 First, she contended 
that the court erred in granting summary judgment because there was a genuine 
dispute of fact that the court failed to account for when it inappropriately exclud-
ed evidence that would have established the dispute.81 Second, Lowry argued 
that the use of the dog against her violated her Fourth Amendment rights because 
it was unreasonable and excessive.82 Lastly, she claimed that the city’s police 
dog policy was itself unconstitutional and the cause of her injury.83   
In considering whether there were disputed facts, the court en banc upheld 
the district court’s conclusion that there were no genuine disputes of material 
fact because the plaintiff did not present admissible evidence to dispute the tes-
timony of the officers.84 The district court’s grant of summary judgment was 
reviewed de novo to determine whether, in looking at the evidence and drawing 
all reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1260. The Ninth Circuit determined that the force used did not violate Low-
ry’s Fourth Amendment rights, and therefore the officers’ actions were constitutional, so the city 
could not be held liable under the precedent set in Monell. Id. In Monell, the Court held that for the 
purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, a local government is a “person” subject to suit and can be 
held liable when the constitutional deprivation comes as a result of government custom. See 436 U.S. 
at 690–91 (involving female employees of New York City who brought an action challenging policies 
requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence, which the Court found constitutional). 
If the Court in Lowry had instead determined the officer’s actions were unreasonable, the next step in 
the analysis would have been to evaluate whether or not the “bite and hold” police dog policy in gen-
eral was unconstitutional. See id. (holding that a city can only be held liable if the officer’s actions 
were unconstitutional); Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1260 (concluding that because Lowry did not suffer a 
constitutional injury, she would be unable to establish the city’s liability and therefore the court would 
not reach a municipal liability analysis under Monell). 
 78 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1262–63 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting); Lowry v. City of San Diego (Lowry 
II), 818 F.3d 840, 854 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 79 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1263 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting); Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 854. 
 80 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1255. 
 81 See id. (concerning the evidentiary decision). 
 82 See id. (concerning the Graham reasonableness analysis). 
 83 See id. (concerning the issue of municipal liability). 
 84 See id. at 1256. The plaintiff claimed that the door was not open, that it was dark in the suite, 
and that she did not hear the warning given by the officers. Id. at 1255–56. Because she failed to offer 
firsthand testimony or contradicting evidence of these facts, the court determined that there was no 
genuine dispute of fact. Id. She testified that the door automatically closes, and because of that specu-
lated that the door was closed, which the court rejected. Id. at 1255. She testified that the room was 
dark, yet she presented no contradicting evidence of that. Id. Lastly, the plaintiff’s testimony that she 
did not hear a warning is not dispositive or admissible because, given that she was sleeping at the time 
the warning would have been announced, she was in no position to know what was said. Id. at 1255–
56. 
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there was a genuine issue of material fact.85 The court found that Lowry’s testi-
mony was speculative and it was not manifestly erroneous for the district court 
to conclude that the plaintiff’s testimony lacked personal knowledge and was 
therefore not sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact.86 
In his dissent for the en banc opinion, Judge Thomas took issue with the 
district court’s evidentiary rulings, arguing that the district court’s exclusion of 
the plaintiff’s testimony was “manifestly erroneous and prejudicial.”87 The 
dissent reasoned that even the sort of “uncorroborated and self-serving testi-
mony” like the evidence in question here could be sufficient to establish a gen-
uine dispute of fact because it was legally relevant, internally consistent, and 
based on her personal knowledge of the door.88 Therefore, the dissent argued, 
the district court erred when it assessed the plaintiff’s credibility, which is the 
function of the jury and not the judge, and subsequently excluded her testimo-
ny.89 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. at 1254 (citing Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011)) (noting that 
without a material factual dispute, the objective reasonableness of the police officer’s actions was a 
“pure question of law”). Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a judgment as a 
matter of law is appropriate where the movant shows there is not genuine dispute of material fact. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 86 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1254 (citing Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1224 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that the standard for reviewing evidentiary rulings made in the context of summary judgment 
is “abuse of discretion” and can only be reversed if the decision was “manifestly erroneous and preju-
dicial”)). 
 87 Id. at 1262 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (citing Bias, 508 F.3d at 1224). 
 88 Id. at 1262–63 (citing Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 
S.E.C. v. Phan, 500 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2007)) (acknowledging that uncorroborated declarations 
are often self-serving)); see also Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. REV. 435, 437 
(2014) (noting that the judicial system has consistently undermined the jury’s ability to evaluate evi-
dence and make inferences); Don Zupanec, Summary Judgment—Credibility Assessment, 12 FED. 
LITIGATOR 6 (2005) (stating that in the context of summary judgment, assessments of credibility and 
determinations based on conflicting versions of events are duties of the jury and that in deciding a 
summary judgment motion, a court should not weigh evidence or make credibility assessments). But 
see James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1523, 1554 (1995) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1990)) (noting 
that the question of whether a judge may weigh evidence when deciding a summary judgment motion 
has conflicting answers). 
 89See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1263 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (citing Nigro, 784 F.3d at 498) (cau-
tioning that a piece of evidence should not be ignored simply because of its self-serving nature and 
advising that even this sort of evidence can be sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact where it is 
based on the individual’s own knowledge, legally relevant, and internally consistent). The dissent 
points out that a district court generally cannot grant summary judgment based on a credibility as-
sessment of the evidence because that is a function of the jury along with weighing the evidence and 
drawing inferences. See id. (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (explaining that a 
district court usually cannot grant summary judgment on the basis of a credibility assessment of the 
evidence) and Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 332 (1995) (observing that conclusions regarding credi-
bility, considerations of evidence, and the making of legitimate inferences based on the facts are func-
tions of the jury)). 
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In evaluating the reasonableness of the use of force in this case, each 
court first analyzed the severity of the physical intrusion on the plaintiff’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by assessing the type and amount of force used.90 
On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that 
the force in this case was “moderate.”91 The Ninth Circuit distinguished this case 
from Chew, because unlike in Chew, where the police dog was out of sight and 
out of the reach of an order, the officer in this situation followed close behind his 
dog and immediately called the dog off.92 Therefore, the risk of harm was dimin-
ished and the Ninth Circuit determined the force was moderate.93 
In contrast, the initial Ninth Circuit in Lowry II determined that a reason-
able juror could have found that unleashing Bak into the office posed a high 
risk of severe harm to anyone inside.94 The analysis in the Lowry II  decision 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See id. at 1256 (finding that the risk of harm and the actual harm caused was moderate because 
of the brevity of the contact, due in part to the handler’s close proximity to the dog); Lowry II, 818 
F.3d 847 (citing Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441) (emphasizing that both the amount and type of force, includ-
ing the inherent risk of harm in using that type of force, should be considered and concluding that the 
force was severe because the plaintiff could have ended up with far worse injuries, similar to Chew);  
Lowry v. City of San Diego (Lowry I), No. 11-CV-946-MMA, 2013 WL 2396062 *1, *1 (S.D. Cal. 
2013) (distinguishing from Chew and finding the amount of force used to be moderate due to the brev-
ity of the encounter and relatively minor injuries). 
 91 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1256; Lowry I, 2013 WL at *1. Determining the type and amount of force 
within the context of police dogs depends on the specific factual circumstances. Lowry, 858 F.3d at 
1256; see Smith, 394 F.3d at 701–02 (holding that use of police dog was excessive force when dog 
was sicced on plaintiff three times); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441 (holding that use of dog was severe be-
cause dog bit plaintiff three times, dragged him, and caused significant injury to his arm). But see 
Miller, 394 F.3d at 964 (concluding that although the force from the dog was considerable and seri-
ous, it was reasonable when the dog apprehended a fleeing suspect with a bite that lasted close to a 
minute, causing significant injury to plaintiff’s arm). 
 92 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257 (concluding that the officer’s proximity to the dog resulted in a 
shorter period of contact and therefore a more moderate use of force); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441 (involv-
ing a dog that was out of contact with his handler and had nearly severed the arm of the plaintiff be-
fore his handler was able to call him off, resulting in a more severe use of force). The encounter be-
tween the plaintiff and the dog was so brief the officer did not know if contact had actually occurred. 
Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257. The analysis adopted by the en banc court was consistent with the evalua-
tion by the district court, which also found the force inflicted to be moderate. See id.; Lowry I, 2013 
WL at *5 (concluding the force was moderate based on the brevity of the contact and extent of injury). 
 93 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257 (citing Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441) (reasoning that despite Ninth Cir-
cuit precedent labeling dog bites as severe, the force in this case was moderate given that the officer in 
this case quickly called off the dog, diminishing the risk of harm,); see also id. at 1262 (Thomas, C.J., 
dissenting) (outlining Ninth Circuit precedent for determining this sort of intrusion to be serious). 
 94 Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 849. The court reasoned that the district court overlooked the type of 
force employed and focused only on the consequences of the force instead of also considering the 
inherent risk of a particular type of force. Id. (citing Miller, 340 F.3d at 964 (assessing the gravity of 
the Fourth Amendment intrusion by evaluating both the type and amount of force used), Glenn, 673 
F.3d at 871–72 (considering the dangerous capabilities of a beanbag shotgun), and Chew, 27 F.3d at 
1441 (concluding the police dog force was severe not only because of the injuries caused, but also 
because of the dog’s training and undisputed testimony that dog bites could be fatal)). The dissent to 
the en banc opinion, rather than labeling the force as severe or moderate, determined that a reasonable 
jury could find that the use of force was moderate or severe when assessing the reasonableness of the 
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likens the present case to Chew and concludes that the force in this case was 
severe, relying on precedent from previous dog bite cases.95 Similar to Chew, 
the K9 officer admitted that dog bites could be fatal and that the dog in this 
case was similarly trained to “bite and hold,” without any ability to differenti-
ate between suspects and other people.96 Combined with the dog being off 
leash and its precise location being unknown to the handler for a brief dura-
tion, the court reasoned that a reasonable juror could find that releasing the dog 
into the suite posed an increased danger to anyone in the room.97 
When evaluating the government’s interest in the use of force, the first 
Graham factor to consider is whether or not there was an immediate threat to 
the safety of officers or others, which the Ninth Circuit determined in this case 
weighed in favor of the government.98 Comparing the case to Miller, where the 
court had concluded that the officers were entitled to their assumptions about 
the potential danger of the suspect, the court concluded that the situation in the 
present case was also objectively threatening.99 In contrast, the dissent to the 
                                                                                                                           
force at the time the decision was made to use the dog, not in hindsight. Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1262 
(Thomas C.J. dissenting). 
 95 See Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 848 (finding that the use of force in this case was severe); Smith, 394 
F.3d 701–02 (holding police dog are the most severe form of force that can be authorized short of 
deadly force); Miller, 340 F.3d at 964 (holding that use of police dog was a severe intrusion on the 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441 (holding that use of police dog was 
severe force). 
 96 See Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 848–49 (comparing to Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441). Handlers are trained 
to keep their dogs within range of communication at all times and that if there is a possibility of sepa-
ration, the officer should not dispatch the dog, although this is not always the case. Dorriety, supra 
note 6, at 94. When the dog is out of communication range, the dog in a sense becomes the decision-
maker and the handler loses control of the apprehension, which is contrary to what the bite and hold 
method teaches. See id. 
 97 See Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 849 (citing Torres, 648 F.3d at 1126 (finding that a jury could deter-
mine that any belief by an officer that a situation was dangerous could be unjustified and finding that 
there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether an officer had correctly assessed the 
dangerousness of the circumstances when deciding to use force)). 
 98 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257 (reasoning the triggered burglar alarm and lack of response to the 
officers’ warnings gave the officers reason to believe a burglary was in progress and that they were 
entitled to protect themselves from danger). See generally Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (establishing the 
immediate threat to safety as a factor in the analysis). 
 99 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1258 (citing Miller, 340 F.3d at 965) (reasoning that the officers were enti-
tled to their assumptions in Miller because the suspect was hiding in the woods, they did not know if he 
had any weapons, and he had ignored the officers warning about the police dog). The majority relied on 
Frunz v. City of Tacoma to assert that when officers suspect an active burglary and do not know what 
might be inside, they may reasonably assume that a confronted suspected may flee or put up armed re-
sistance. Id. (citing Frunz v. City of Tacoma, 468 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that so 
long as officers have probable cause for believing a burglary is in progress, “in such exigent circum-
stances,” the police may use all appropriate force upon entering)). Alternatively, the dissent criticized 
the majority’s use of Frunz, asserting that the case only stood for the proposition that officers must 
consider all known facts and circumstances in determining whether armed resistance from a suspected 
burglar is likely. See id. at 1264 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that Frunz merely stated that 
burglars can sometimes be considered dangerous). 
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en banc opinion disagreed with the district court’s evaluation of the immediate 
threat to safety.100 Unlike in Miller, where officers knew of the suspect’s pro-
pensity to carry a weapon, the officers in this case had no specific reason to 
assume that the person inside of the office was armed.101 
Turning to the second Graham factor, the severity of the crime at issue, 
the en banc majority determined that given the facts of the situation, the offic-
ers reasonably believed they were responding to a burglary.102 The court cited 
precedent demonstrating that burglary and attempted burglary carry an inherent 
risk of violence, often because both crimes can end in a violent confrontation, 
which weighed in favor of the city.103 Conversely, the dissent asserted that 
even if officers considered burglary to be a serious crime, the dispute here cen-
tered on whether or not the circumstances indicated that a burglary was actual-
ly taking place.104 If all reasonable inferences were drawn in favor of the plain-
tiff, a reasonable jury could have found that a closed door made it more likely 
that there had been a false alarm rather than an active burglary.105 In regards to 
the final Graham factor, whether or not the suspect was resisting or evading 
arrest, although the en banc majority asserted that the factor did not weigh sub-
stantially in favor of either party, the dissent asserted that there was nothing to 
indicate resistance on the plaintiff’s part, weighing the factor in favor of her.106 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See id. (finding the factor in favor of the plaintiff because a reasonable jury could find that the 
officers beliefs were unreasonable and that they had little indication that there was an armed suspect 
inside that posed a threat to the officers). 
 101 Id. At 1258 (majority opinion). The first Ninth Circuit panel also distinguished the Lowry case 
from Miller, asserting that the officers in Miller were reasonable in their assumption that the suspect 
posed an immediate threat because the officer was chasing a felony suspect, who had recently possessed 
a weapon, had mental health issues, ignored warnings, and had a strategic advantage over the officers in 
the woods. Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 849–50 (citing Miller 340 F.3d at 965–66). Instead the court likens 
the case to Chew, pointing out that the plaintiff did not engage in behavior that could be considered 
threatening and concluding that the circumstances here may not lead a reasonable jury to conclude that 
the plaintiff had posed an immediate threat. Id. at 849 (citing Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441). 
 102 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257 (considering factors like the burglar alarm had been triggered late at 
night, the door to the suite was slightly open, lack of response to the officer’s warnings and reasoning 
that officers had reasonably concluded that a burglary may be ongoing). 
 103 Id. at 1257–58 (citing Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 9 (2011) and Sandoval v. Las Vegas 
Metro Police Dep’t, 756 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 104 Id. at 1264–65 (Thomas, C.J. dissenting). 
 105 Id.  
 106 See id. at 1258 (majority opinion) (reasoning that the lack of response to the warning and the 
dark room gave officers little to no information about whether someone was resisting or evading arrest 
and although the lack of response could be perceived as evading, the factor does not weigh in favor of 
either party); id. at 1265 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (citing Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 830 
(9th Cir. 2010)) (asserting that when a suspect’s only form of resistance is a failure to comply with an 
order and when that resistance is not belligerent, the resistance is considered passive and does not 
factor heavily in favor of the government). It is also worth noting that although the court may consider 
additional factors, such as whether or not less intrusive means were available or whether a warning 
was given, because neither one of these was sufficiently raised in this case, a discussion of these fac-
tors has been omitted. See id. at 1259–60 (majority opinion) (mentioning briefly these alternative 
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The final part of the Graham reasonableness analysis requires the court to 
balance the seriousness of the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights with the government’s countervailing interests.107 The en banc majority 
determined that the officers had a compelling interest in protecting themselves 
in this uncertain and potentially dangerous situation and therefore the use of 
force, which was not severe, did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.108 The dissent 
on the other hand concluded that when balancing this severe intrusion with the 
government’s interest in using force, a reasonable jury could have concluded 
that the city’s use of force did not justify the level of force in this case and 
therefore the case should go to a jury.109 
In regard to the issue of municipal liability, the court in Lowry held that as 
a result of the determination that the force was not excessive and therefore 
constitutional, the City of San Diego could not be held liable.110 The dissent 
disagreed, stating the court erred in concluding that the city could not be liable 
even if unreasonable force has been established.111 Lowry claimed the city’s 
affirmative “bite-and-hold” policy was the source of her constitutional injury 
and given the city’s admission that the officer acted pursuant to an official pol-
icy, the dissent determined a reasonable jury could find that the policy was the 
cause of the harm, thus subjecting the city to Monell liability.112  
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT WAS INCORRECT IN ITS GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
IN EXCESSIVE FORCE CASES 
Continuing prior Ninth Circuit precedent, the en banc decision in Lowry v. 
City of San Diego substantively added to the body of law in the Ninth Circuit 
upholding the constitutionality of the use of the “bite and hold” technique by 
                                                                                                                           
factors and noting that officers are not required to use least intrusive means); id. at 1265–66 (Thomas, 
C.J., dissenting) (mentioning these alternative factors and noting because the record is lacking on this 
issue, the existence of alternative methods does not influence the excessive force analysis here). 
 107 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see, e.g., Miller, 340 F.3d at 966 (balancing the seriousness of the 
intrusion with the government’s interest of the use of force by considering whether the force that was 
applied was reasonably necessary given the circumstances). 
 108 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1260 (concluding that the officers reasonably suspected that a burglary 
was in progress and the force was not severe). 
 109 See id. at 1266 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (holding that the district court erred in deciding this 
case as a matter of law). 
 110 See id. at 1260 (majority opinion).  
 111 See id. at 1266 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 
(1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Chew, 27 F.3d at 1444) (reiterating the standards for municipal lia-
bility and explaining that a city’s policy or custom causes harm where it is the “moving force” behind 
the constitutional injury). 
 112 See id. (discussing the plaintiff’s Monell claim). 
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police dogs.113 The issue on appeal is one noteworthy to all cities in the Ninth 
Circuit who use police dogs to search buildings and find criminals.114 Resolv-
ing this case on summary judgment based on the reasonableness of the specific 
situation precluded the plaintiff from moving to the next step, a constitutional 
analysis of the use of police dogs as a policy and government custom.115 La-
beling the canine force as moderate and granting summary judgment strength-
ens the ability of municipal and individual defendants to avoid liability and 
further diminishes the effectiveness of § 1983 claims as a tool for plaintiffs 
who have been harmed by government actors.116 
In regards to the summary judgment in this case, there was a factual dis-
pute here based on testimony from the plaintiff of her firsthand knowledge of 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See Lowry v. City of San Diego (Lowry), 858 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2017); Miller v. Clark 
County, 340 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 114 Brief of Amicus Curiae League of California Cities After Grant of Rehearing En Banc ex rel. 
City of San Diego for Affirmance of the District Court’s Order at 1, Lowry, 858 F.3d 1248, No. 13-
56141, 2016 WL 5929183. Dogs have been a part of law enforcement since the early 1900s in the 
northeastern part of the country, however it was not until the 1960s that their use really began to 
spread throughout the country. Dorriety, supra note 6, at 89. Most, if not all, law enforcement agen-
cies use a continuum in their use-of-force training programs, which helps officers to determine the 
appropriate level of conduct for a given situation based on a reasonable assessment of the circum-
stances. See id. at 90–91. The continuum typically includes “hard” and “soft” categories based on the 
likelihood and severity of injury, a range from deadly force to officer presence, and a variety of inter-
mediate categories based on the types of force an officer may employ. See id. at 91. Once police dogs 
became commonplace, agencies included them in the use-of-force continuum and chose to classify 
them as “less-than-lethal.” See id. at 93 (citing Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(addressing the use of deadly force and police dogs for the first time and holding that the use of police 
dogs was not deadly force because dog bites are rarely fatal)). The reasoning for classifying them as 
“less-than-lethal” was that dog bites rarely resulted in death and it gave officers an alternative to using 
actually deadly force like a gun. Id. at 93. Additionally, many police departments have separate poli-
cies regarding the use of police dogs as they are often used solely for locating people or items with no 
force involved. Id. at 96–97. 
 115 See Lowry v. City of San Diego (Lowry II), 818 F.3d 840, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (reasoning that 
because the officer’s actions were reasonable, the city could not be held liable, which eliminates an 
evaluation of the city’s police dog policy); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 
(1978) (explaining that in order to succeed in a § 1983 claim against a city, the public must prove that 
the constitutional violation was caused pursuant to a “city policy, regulation, custom, or usage”); 
Singh, supra note 15, at 120 (pointing out that resolving § 1983 questions on summary judgment 
insulates city policy from review). 
 116 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257; Shad E. Christman, Note, Excessive Force Cases and Incidents 
of Deadly Police Force Ignite Possibilities for Change in Eighth Circuit § 1983 Law, 62 S.D. L. REV. 
418, 451 (2017) (emphasizing that excessive force disputes are complex and mixed questions of law 
and fact and that the use of summary judgment in this context weakens the effectiveness of § 1983 
claims). The dissent in Lowry noted that a reasonable jury could find that the force in this case was 
severe or moderate, however the Graham factors all weigh in favor of the plaintiff if the facts are 
construed in her favor, meaning that a reasonable jury could have found that the force was unreasona-
ble. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1266, 1268 (Thomas, C.J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing that where a plaintiff has succeeded in raising a dispute of fact in regard to 
the violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, it is for a jury to determine if there was a violation and 
whether the government was responsible for that injury). 
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the office.117 Although the force itself may have been reasonable given the cir-
cumstances, the en banc court erred in affirming the district court’s exclusion 
of the plaintiff’s testimony and furthermore in granting summary judgment, as 
this case should have been left to a jury to decide.118 Lowry’s testimony, albeit 
self-serving, was based on her own personal knowledge of the door and the 
situation, was legally relevant, and consistent and therefore should have been 
sufficient to raise a dispute of fact sufficient to overcome summary judg-
ment.119  The analysis of the Graham v. Connor factors hinges on whether or 
not the door to the suite was open or closed; inappropriately excluding this 
evidence significantly affected the Graham analysis.120 Due to the fact-
intensive nature of the reasonableness analysis, the evaluation of the Graham 
factors and the question of reasonableness are not well suited for precise legal 
determinations and should therefore be left for a jury.121 
Defendants often move for summary judgment in Fourth Amendment ex-
cessive force cases and when summary judgment is granted, the plaintiff is 
prevented from presenting the facts before a jury, whose role it is to evaluate 
the reasonableness of human behavior.122  In both Chew v. Gates and Smith v. 
City of Hemet, the question of whether or not the use of a dog was unreasona-
ble was heard by a jury, because not all the Graham factors weighed in favor 
of one party and consequently a reasonable person could have found that the 
force was unreasonable.123 In contrast, the court in Miller v. Clark County de-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1262–63 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the exclusion of 
the plaintiff’s testimony denied her the opportunity to demonstrate a dispute of fact and explaining 
that at the summary judgment stage when there is conflicting testimony, the court cannot weigh one 
party’s evidence against the others, but rather must assume the trust of the evidence put forward by the 
nonmoving party). 
 118 See id. at 1263–65 (stating that a reasonable jury could have concluded that the government 
did not have a strong enough interest in using force that would outweigh the severity of the intrusion 
of the police dog). In the context of summary judgment, when there are no material factual disputes, the 
objective reasonableness of law enforcement actions is a “pure question of law.” Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 
846 (citing Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 
550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007))). When there are disputed issues of material fact, the objective reasona-
bleness of conduct becomes a question of fact that is best left to the jury. Id. (citing Torres, 648 F.3d 
at 1123). 
 119 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1263 (Thomas, C.J. dissenting). 
 120 See id. (reasoning that because Lowry’s testimony was based on her first-hand knowledge of 
the situation and her personal memory that she did not prop the door open, her testimony was specific, 
“legally relevant, and internally consistent” and was sufficient to raise the genuine dispute of material 
fact necessary to avoid summary judgment). 
 121 See Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.3d 
1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991)) (explaining that due to its fact intensive nature, a determination of reason-
ableness is not easily decided as a precise question of law and therefore is generally an issue for the 
jury); Blum, Qualified Immunity, supra note 35, at 577 (stating that the analysis established in Gra-
ham consist of questions that should be considered by the jury). 
 122 Davis, supra note 17, at 294 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 123 See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 698, 707 (9th Cir. 2005) (drawing all inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party and finding that a reasonable jury could have found that the force in this case, 
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termined that based on what the officers knew before the decision, the court 
found no material dispute of fact and concluded as a matter of law that the 
force was reasonably necessary given the circumstances because all of the fac-
tors overwhelming weighed in favor of the government in the balancing test.124 
In Lowry, not all of the factors weighed in favor of the government.125 Whether 
or not the suspect was resisting does not weigh strongly in favor of either party 
here and even if the officers were entitled to consider burglary a serious crime, 
the immediacy of the threat in this case was not quite as clear as the majority 
suggests, especially if the door was closed.126 The Graham factors in this case 
were not clear-cut, therefore it would have been more appropriate to have the 
jury resolve this issue given that a reasonable jury could have concluded that 
the force in this case was excessive.127 
Further, the court’s grant of summary judgment prevented the possibility 
of digging deeper into a constitutional analysis of the use of police dogs in 
general through the issue of municipal liability.128 Unlike in Chew, where the 
court reversed summary judgment on the issue of municipal liability, the ma-
jority in Lowry did not reach an analysis of municipal liability, which entails 
an evaluation of the practice as a government policy, because it was barred by 
the determination on summary judgment that the force used in this particular 
case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.129 Even if the officer’s ac-
                                                                                                                           
which included pepper spray, rough physical handling, dog bites, and physical assaults, was unreason-
able and therefore the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443 
(holding that the question of reasonableness in this case must be submitted to a jury because not all of 
the Graham factors supported one party or the other); Brief of Amicus Curiae League of California 
Cities, supra note 114, at 6 (discussing the differences between Chew, Miller, and Smith). 
 124 See Miller, 340 F.3d at 968 (concerning officers who were actively pursuing a suspect whom 
they knew to be hiding in unfamiliar woods, potentially with a weapon, a history of mental illness, 
and a warrant for his arrest in connection to a felony). 
 125 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257–59 (finding that the severity of the crime and the immediate 
threat to safety factors weighed in favor of the government whereas the evading and resisting arrest 
factor did not weigh in favor of either party). 
 126 See id. at 1265 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (noting that if all reasonable inferences were drawn 
in the plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could have found that the officers had reason to be skeptical 
that a burglary was occurring and would therefore tip the balance of factors in favor of Lowry). 
 127 See id. at 1248 (majority opinion) (granting summary judgment where all factors either 
weighed in favor of the government or were neutral); Lowry II, 818 F.3d at 840 (reversing summary 
judgment where the Graham factors did not all weigh in favor of one party); Smith, 394 F.3d at 698, 
703 (reversing summary judgment where the Graham factors did not all weigh in favor of one party 
and a reasonable jury could have determined the force was unreasonable); Miller, 340 F.3d at 959 
(granting summary judgment where all factors weighed in favor of government); Chew, 27 F.3d at 
1432 (reversing summary judgment where not all the factors weighed in favor of one party). 
 128 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1260 (concluding that because the plaintiff did not establish a constitu-
tional injury, she cannot demonstrate liability on the part of the city); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1444–45 (re-
versing summary judgment on grounds that a reasonable jury could have found that the city’s policy 
was responsible for the constitutional injury). 
 129 See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1260 (holding that because the officer’s actions were reasonable and 
therefore constitutional, the city of San Diego could not be held liable under Monell, which establishes 
22 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
tions were reasonable, summary judgment in this case precluded the plaintiff 
from presenting evidence to the jury to prove that despite a reasonable action 
here, the city was still at fault for providing its officers with bite-and-hold dogs 
when less dangerous means were available.130 The use of summary judgment in 
this case and other excessive force cases expands the government’s ability to use 
force against citizens while also diminishing an individual’s ability to effectively 
challenge a forceful intrusion on his or her right to be free from unreasonable 
seizures.131 Section 1983 excessive force cases require fact intensive inquiries in 
order to evaluate the reasonableness of the situation, therefore summary judg-
ment should be used sparingly to prevent excessive insulation of potentially 
harmful and even unconstitutional government policies and actions.132 
CONCLUSION 
When evaluating a claim of excessive force using the objective Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness test established in Graham, courts should use 
summary judgment sparingly. The reasonableness test is a fact-intensive in-
quiry; unless all the factors weigh overwhelmingly in favor of one party, it is 
difficult to justify deciding the case as a matter of law. That determination de-
pends on a thorough analysis of the facts, a job traditionally left to the jury. 
Even if a reasonable jury would have found that the force in this case was 
moderate and that the force here was reasonable, the dispute of fact raised by 
the plaintiff was nonetheless enough to create a question as to what a reasona-
ble jury would decide. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case has created 
potentially problematic precedent for future canine excessive force cases, rais-
ing the bar that plaintiffs will have to meet to successfully demonstrate that the 
use of canines was unreasonable in their own cases. 
NATASHA DOBROTT 
                                                                                                                           
municipal liability); Blum, Qualified Immunity, supra note 35, at 578. If the Lowry case had gone to a 
trial, the jury would have had to consider not only whether this particular use of force was reasonable, 
but also whether the general policy of “bite and hold” police dogs was constitutional or in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (concluding that Congress did intend for munici-
palities be included among persons to whom § 1983 applies); Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1255 (establishing 
that in order to prevail on her claim, plaintiff must have established that “(1) SDPD’s use of a dog 
amounted to an unconstitutional application of excessive force, and (2) the city’s policy caused the 
constitutional wrong”). 
 130 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1445 (explaining if plaintiff could prove there was a less dangerous, but 
effective means of dog training was available, then a jury could decide the city’s failure to use that 
alternative method constituted “unreasonable municipal action” regarding the use of force). 
 131 See Davis, supra note 17, at 302. 
 132 See Christman, supra note 116, at 451 (noting that summary judgment should also be used 
sparingly in excessive force cases where the individual officer is the defendant to prevent qualified 
immunity, a legal protection for government officers in cases like this, from becoming an insurmount-
able defense). 
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